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Abstract
Website privacy policies are too long to read and difficult to
understand. The over-sophisticated language makes privacy
notices to be less effective than they should be. People be-
come even less willing to share their personal information
when they perceive the privacy policy as vague. This paper
focuses on decoding vagueness from a natural language pro-
cessing perspective. While thoroughly identifying the vague
terms and their linguistic scope remains an elusive challenge,
in this work we seek to learn vector representations of words
in privacy policies using deep neural networks. The vector
representations are fed to an interactive visualization tool
(LSTMVis) to test on their ability to discover syntactically
and semantically related vague terms. The approach holds
promise for modeling and understanding language vagueness.
Introduction
Website privacy policies represent a legally binding agree-
ment between the users and website operators. They are ver-
bose, too long to read, and difficult to understand. Albeit the
paramount importance, people tend to ignore these privacy
notices unless a serious concern is raised, e.g., by the media.
Research studies have explored various means to improve
the effectiveness of privacy notice and choice. Cranor et
al. (2002; 2006) introduce a standard machine-readable for-
mat for website privacy policies using the Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences (P3P). The Usable Privacy Policy Project1
aims to extract key privacy policy features for presentation
to end-users in a structured and easily understandable for-
mat (Sadeh et al. 2013). These approaches allow the users
to quickly jump to the text passages that are related to cer-
tain key privacy practices. It alleviates the “too long to read”
challenge brought by document length. On the other hand,
studies that tackle the “difficult to understand” challenge
have been largely absent from this space, partly because of
the complexity and richness of natural language.
One might wonder why privacy notices need to adopt such
sophisticated language in the first place. Bhatia et al. (2016)
suggest two causes in their recent work. First, the policies
need to be comprehensive, covering all possible cases such
as the physical places (e.g., stores, offices) and web/mobile
Copyright c© 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1https://www.usableprivacy.org
Condition (9): depending, necessary, appropriate,
inappropriate, as needed, as applicable, otherwise
reasonably, sometimes, from time to time
Generalization (12): generally, mostly, widely, general,
commonly, usually, normally, typically, largely, often,
primarily, among other things
Modality (8): may, might, can, could, would, likely,
possible, possibly
Numeric Quantifier (11): anyone, certain, everyone,
numerous, some, most, few, much, many, various,
including but not limited to
Table 1: Table adopted from (Reidenberg et al. 2016). It includes a
total of 40 vague terms that are manually identified by experts from
15 privacy policies. The terms are divided into four categories.
platforms. Second, the policy statements must be accurate,
which means they are true to all data practices and systems.
Clearly it will be difficult for the legal counsel to antici-
pate all the future needs, naturally they resort to generaliza-
tion and sophistication to frame the statements, introducing
vagueness to the text. An example statement is: “The email
address is used for sending account notifications and other
system-related information as needed.”
Vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon that is not yet fully
studied in the natural language processing (NLP) commu-
nity. A concept is considered vague if it lacks clarity or cor-
responds to borderline cases (e.g., tall, short). Even terms
like “disability” raise questions such as “how much loss of
vision is required before one is legally blind?”2 Farkas et
al. (2010) introduce a shared task on detecting uncertainty
cues (i.e., hedges and weasels) from biological articles and
Wikipedia pages. Reidenberg et al. (2016) manually analyze
a set of 15 privacy policies and identify 40 vague terms (Ta-
ble 1) which we also adopt in this study. Note that there ap-
pears to be a dilemma: if a collection of vague terms can
be pre-specified, classifying a piece of text as vague or not
seems trivial; on the other hand, given the richness of natural
language, creating such a comprehensive list of vague terms
can be highly challenging, if possible at all.
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vagueness
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The main contribution of this work lies in learning vec-
tor representations for words in privacy policies using deep
neural networks. There is one vector representation for each
word token in the privacy policies. The vector representa-
tions are iteratively learnt so that they would perform well
in two tasks: predicting the next word given its context (e.g.,
“we do not request any ”→ “information”) and predict-
ing whether or not a word is in a list of pre-specified vague
terms (e.g., “may”→ “Vague (V)”, “email”→ “Not Vague
(N)”. The 40 vague terms in Table 1 are used in this study.
We hypothesize that certain dimensions of the vector rep-
resentation encode the semantic meaning of the word, in-
cluding vagueness. These vector representations are further
fed to an interactive visualization tool (LSTMVis) to test
on their ability to discover semantically related terms. The
approach holds promise for modeling vagueness of words
within context. The visualization tool allows the privacy re-
searchers to perform knowledge discovery on the website
privacy policies.3
Related Work
We discuss related work along three dimensions: law, pri-
vacy policy, and natural language.
In the American Constitution, there is a “void for vague-
ness” doctrine. It states that the law should be clearly spec-
ified so that the average citizen would understand. If a rule
is vague, it is unenforceable. Researchers in the law com-
munity have thus exploited the vagueness of legal language
and interpretation of boundary decisions. In his seminal
work, Waldron (1994) distinguishes ambiguity, contestabil-
ity, vagueness, and introduce a general term “indetermi-
nacy” to cover the three cases. Post (1994) argues that the le-
gal rules cannot be simply rewritten to be more precise, since
they are not in isolation but reflect the forms of social order.
Jonsson (2009) suggests that vagueness in law does not call
for specific interpretation of the law itself, but only for an
application of the law on case-by-case basis. Studies in (Her-
nacki 2012) suggest that the decades-old antihacking statue
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is in need of a
face-lift. Phrases such as “involve” and “other similar infor-
mation” are not providing enough clarity. Liebwald (2013)
concerns that the vagueness in combination with the elas-
ticity of legal interpretation may affect the binding force
of law. The paper introduces a theory called Hyperbola of
Meaning. Raffman (2015) provides a characterization of lin-
guistic vagueness. Vague words possess unclear boundaries,
but are distinguished from ambiguity, underspecificity, and
several forms of indeterminacy. Low et al. (2015) illustrate
the application of the vagueness doctrine to four Supreme
Court vagueness cases. They point out that when determin-
ing vagueness of statutes, it is important to take the intersec-
tion between state and federal law into account. Hunt (2015)
studies “epistemicism”, which states that vague statements
are either true or false even though it is impossible to know
which. The author suggests that vagueness should be ex-
plained within the theory of legal interpretation.
3We plan to release the code and data models upon acceptance
of the paper.
Vagueness has been studied within the scope of website
privacy policies. In particular, Reidenberg et al. (2016) and
Bhatia et al. (2016) introduce a theory of vagueness for
privacy policy statements. The theory indicates how vague
modifiers can be composed to increase or decrease the over-
all vagueness. They show that the increases in vagueness of-
ten decrease users’ willingness to share personal informa-
tion. Our work is different from these studies in that we do
not attempt to generate a vagueness score for a given piece
of text. Instead, we seek to exploit deep neural networks to
learn word representations that encode semantic meanings
and vagueness.
There are other studies that focus on improving the ef-
fectiveness of privacy policies. Vail et al. (2008) compare
various ways to present privacy policy information to online
users. Their findings suggest that users perceive paragraph-
form policies to be more secure than others, however the
user comprehension of such paragraph-form policies is poor.
Kelley et al. (2010) develop a nutrition label approach for
representing the key practices of privacy policies. They show
that a standardized table format is effective in assisting users
with their information needs. Micheti et al. (2010) aims
to identify guidelines for privacy plicies that children and
teen can understand and accurately interpret. Phrases which
cause misunderstanding and vagueness include “may,” “ex-
cept,” and “aside from.” Many users, especially young peo-
ple, are aware that privacy policies are vague due to strategic
reasons of service providers. The empirical study in (Lam-
mel and Pek 2013) discusses Platform for Privacy Prefer-
ences (P3P). As a platform, P3P is used and interpreted
by users to help automate decision making. While being
one of the only widely used languages for privacy poli-
cies, P3P still has downfalls. More rigorous specifications
in language and enforcement of correct use are necessary.
In more recent studies, Reidenberg et al. (2015a; 2015b)
study the effectiveness of privacy notice and choice frame-
work and suggest that people do not agree with each other
when interpreting privacy polices. Wilson et al. (2016b;
2016a) explore crowdsourcing for annotating privacy poli-
cies. They introduce a corpus of 115 privacy policies with
manual annotations of fine-grained data practices.
Comprehensive studies have been missing for understand-
ing vagueness in the natural language processing commu-
nity. Farkas et al. (2010) focus on the detection of uncer-
tainty cues and their linguistic scope in natural language
texts. The motivation behind this task is to distinguish fac-
tual and uncertain information in text, which is of essen-
tial importance to information extraction. Much of the tech-
niques involve sentence-level classifications using SVM,
CRF, and maximum entropy. However, it remains to be seen
if a word- or sentence-level classification formulation is well
suited for this task. In (Alexopoulos and Pavlopoulos 2014),
vagueness is considered to be a linguistic phenomenon. It
arises with a lack of clear boundaries and conditions. These
boundaries usually do not allow concrete distinction. Classi-
fying text as vague or not vague can be subjective, making it
important to look at agreement between interpretations and
annotations. Using a naive Bayes classifier, the study shows
that vague and not vague senses can be separated.
Data
Our dataset consists of 1,010 website privacy policies. These
privacy policies are gathered using Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mturk.com) from the most frequently visited web-
sites across 15 categories, ranging from Arts, Business,
Computers to Science, Shopping, and Sports. The privacy
policy documents have been converted to the XML format
and are available for download publicly.4 Liu et al. (2014)
and Ramanath et al. (2014) perform studies using this
dataset to align policy segments based on the issues they
discuss. For example, text segments that discuss the usage of
cookies (i.e., small data files transferred by the website to the
user’s computer) should be grouped together. They experi-
ment with unsupervised hidden Markov models and demon-
strate that the approaches are more effective than clustering.
In this study, we seek to learn a vector representation for
each word token (i.e., occurrence of the word) in the dataset.
Each privacy policy document is split into a set of sentences;
each sentence is further split into a set of word tokens. All
word tokens are lowercased. We remove sentences that con-
tain 3 word tokens or less, since they are too short and of-
ten noisy (e.g., “Back to Top”). A special token 〈/s〉 is used
as the end-of-sentence symbol. A word token is deemed
vague if it is included in a pre-specified list of vague terms
(see Table 1). Note that we consider word tokens such as
“among other things” as vague, but an individual word (e.g.,
“among”) is not vague when placed in other context (e.g.,
“among consumers”).
Statistics of the dataset are illustrated in Table 2.
total # of web privacy policies 1,010
total # of sentences 107,076
total # of word tokens 2,534,094
total # and % of vague tokens 59,026 (2.3%)
total # and % of sentences that
contain at least one vague token 41,033 (38.3%)
Table 2: Statistics of the dataset.
Modeling Language and Vagueness
So far we have demonstrated the needs for understanding
language vagueness and described our dataset, we proceed
by introducing a deep neural network for learning vector
representations for words in privacy policies (see Figure 1
for illustration). Traditional approaches to building feature
representation have been largely based on manual feature
extraction (Farkas et al. 2010). The idea behind the deep
neural network is that it learns to automatically construct a
feature representation for each word, in the form of a dense
continuous vector (g ∈ Rd). The feature representation is
optimized so that it could perform well in two tasks: 1) pre-
dicting the next word given previous words in the sentence,
and 2) predicting if the current word is vague or not given the
context. This corresponds to a multi-task learning setting.
4https://usableprivacy.org/data
we may share your contact info
may share your contact info </s>
V N N N N N
Figure 1: A deep neural network for modeling language and vague-
ness in website privacy policies. “Vague”→ V, “Not Vague”→ N.
Deep neural networks have seen considerable success in
a range of natural language processing tasks. Our work
is inspired by recent advances on learning word embed-
dings (Mikolov et al. 2013; Tang et al. 2014) and sequence-
to-sequence models (Sutskever, Vinyals, and Le 2014; Lu-
ong et al. 2016).
Concretely, let x = {x1, x2, · · · , xN} be an input sen-
tence consisting of N word tokens. The word tokens come
from a vocabulary V of size |V| = V. Each word is re-
placed by a pre-trained word embedding (xi ∈ RD) before
it is fed to the neural network. With a slight abuse of nota-
tion, we use xi to represent the word token and xi (bold-
face) to represent its embedding. We use the 300-dimension
(D = 300) word2vec embeddings pre-trained on Google
News dataset with about 100 billion words5. A vocabulary
of 5,000 words is employed in this study (V = 5, 000). They
correspond to the most frequent words in the 1,010 privacy
policies dataset. Among them, 602 words cannot find pre-
trained word2vec embeddings, we thus randomly initiate
the embeddings using a standard normal distribution.
Next we feed the sentence one word at a time to a bi-
directional recurrent neural network (forward layer colored
in blue, backward layer colored in green, see Figure 1). A
recurrent neural network (RNN) corresponds to a language
model, where the goal is to predict the next word given its
previous words. The probability of the entire sequence p(x)
is represented in Eq.(1), whereas the individual probability
p(xt|x1, · · · , xt−1) is calculated by RNN.
p(x) =
N∏
t=1
p(xt|x1, · · · , xt−1) (1)
A recurrent neural network operates on a sequence of
words and creates a hidden state representation ht ∈ Rd
for the word at time step t. It learns a function of the form
ht = f(ht−1,xt), where ht−1 is the hidden state repre-
sentation of the previous time step and xt is the input word
embedding of the current time step. Both the Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) networks and Gated Recurrent Unit
5https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
(GRU) networks are variants of the recurrent neural net-
works. They correspond to different gating mechanisms,
hence different f(·). This work specifically focuses on us-
ing GRU to produce the hidden state representations, where
ht = GRU(ht−1,xt). GRUs have seen considerable suc-
cess in recent NLP applications (Luong et al. 2016). It uses
two neural gates to control the flow of information, where
it ∈ Rd and rt ∈ Rd respectively represent the input and
reset gate. ct ∈ Rd is sometimes referred to as the cell value
and ht ∈ Rd is the hidden state representation we are inter-
ested in.
it = σ(W
ixt +U
iht−1 + bi) (2)
rt = σ(W
rxt +U
rht−1 + br) (3)
ct = tanh(W
cxt +U
cht−1 + bc) (4)
ht = it  ct + (1− it) ht−1 (5)
In the above equations, W i,W r,W c and U i,U r,U c
are parameters, bi, br, bc are biases;  corresponds to the
element-wise product of two vectors; σ(·) is the sigmoid
function; tanh(·) is the hyperbolic tangent function. They
are applied element-wise to the vectors. We experiment with
a bi-directional neural network, where in the forward-pass,
GRU1 admits words from the sentence beginning to end
(Eq.(6)), and in the backward-pass, GRU2 admits the word
sequence reversely (Eq.(7)). The generated hidden states are
colored in blue (forward pass) and green (backward pass)
respectively in Figure 1.
−→
h t = GRU1(
−→
h t−1,xt) (6)
←−
h t = GRU2(
←−
h t−1,xt) (7)
The hidden state generated in the forward pass (
−→
ht) is ex-
pected to carry over semantic information from beginning of
the sentence to the current time step; similarly
←−
ht encodes
information from the current time step to end of sentence.
We concatenate the two vectors of each time step [
−→
ht,
←−
ht]
and feed it to a densely connected layer to create a unified
representation gt ∈ Rl for each word (colored in red in Fig-
ure 1.
gt = tanh(W [
−→
ht,
←−
ht] + b) (8)
where W and b are parameters. Using the vector represen-
tation gt, we learn to complete two tasks: first, gt is used
to predict the next word using a softmax activation function
(Eq.(9)), where p(yt = j|gt) is the probability that the next
word yt is predicted as the j-th word in the vocabulary; sec-
ond, gt is employed to predict if the current word is vague
or not, where p(ct = k|gt) is the probability of the current
word being vague (k = 1) or not (k = 2).
p(yt = j|gt) = exp(wjgt)∑V
j′=1 exp(wj′gt)
(9)
p(ct = k|gt) = exp(wkgt)∑C
k′=1 exp(wk′gt)
(10)
We use θ to represent all the trainable parameters in the
aforementioned deep neural network. The above model can
Figure 2: Training accuracy across 25 epochs.
be trained in an end-to-end fashion using stochastic gradient
descent. In particular RMSProp is used for parameter esti-
mation, which has been shown to perform well in sequence
learning tasks. During training, the model parameters are it-
eratively updated so as to minimize the negative log likeli-
hood of the training data L(θ).
L(θ) =− α
S∑
i=1
N∑
t=1
V∑
j=1
log p(yt = j|gt; θ)
− β
S∑
i=1
N∑
t=1
C∑
k=1
log p(ct = k|gt; θ) (11)
where S=107,076 is the total number of sentences in our
dataset, N=50 is set to be the maximum number of words per
sentence, V=5,000 is the vocabulary size, C=2 is the number
of categories (i.e., vague or not). α and β are scalar coef-
ficients used to indicate the weights of the components in
the leanring objective. They are empirically set to α = 1
and β = 2 in our study. This means that the system is sub-
ject to heavier penalty when it mispredicts the word vague-
ness. We set the dimensionality d = 512 and l = 200. The
deep neural network finally produces a 200-dimension vec-
tor representation for each word in the dataset. The model is
trained for 25 epochs. Accuracy of predicting the identity of
the next word (“Accuracy-Word”) and accuracy for predict-
ing the word vagueness (“Accuracy-Vagueness”) are plotted
in Figure 2. The “Accuracy-Vagueness” curve saturates after
the first couple of epochs, suggesting word-level binary pre-
diction is not a difficult task, whereas the “Accuracy-Word”
curve increases steadily across all the training epochs.
Visualization
The deep neural network presented in the previous section
creates a 200-dimension vector representation for each word
in the privacy policy dataset. The vectors are colored in red
in Figure 1. These vector representations resemble the fea-
ture vectors we normally obtain through a linear model (e.g.,
SVM or maximum entropy) or dimensionality reduction ap-
proach (e.g., SVD). They could be used in downstream clas-
sification tasks such as predicting if a piece of text is vague
or not. However, because of the lack of such large-scale
datasets and consistent annotation guidelines for vagueness
Figure 3: Visualization of the vector representations using LSTMVis.
under the same circumstances necessary or appropriate to personally-identifying information
under the following conditions necessary to personal information
under the following circumstances required to access information
under the circumstances otherwise permitted by financial information
in any case your right to aggregate information
in this case contact information
Table 3: Example similar phrases identified by the visual tool. The given phrases are shown in bold. Note that the similar phrases are hand-
picked. Not all system identified phrases are closely related to the given phrases.
prediction of privacy policies, we choose not to perform em-
pirical evaluation on the datasets. Instead, we seek to inter-
pret the learnt vector representations and explore what infor-
mation is encoded in the 200-dimension vectors.
Researchers strive to understand the neural models in nat-
ural language processing. Very recently, Li et al. (2016) de-
velop strategies to understand the model compositionality.
That is, how sentence meanings are built from the meanings
of words and phrases. The approach measures the “salience”
of each dimension based on how much it contributes to
the final decision, which is approximated using first-order
derivatives. Strobelt et al. (2016) present a visual analysis
tool named LSTMVis6. The tool explores the hidden state
dynamics of a recurrent neural network. It allows the user
to select an input phrase and find similar phrases in the
dataset that demonstrate similar hidden state patterns. We
adopt LSTMVis in our study and import the vector represen-
tations produced in the previous section. The visualization is
presented in Figure 3.
The interface consists of two views: the select view cor-
responds to the upper panel ((A) to (D)) and the match view
corresponds to the lower panel ((E) to (G)). All sentences
in the dataset are concatenated into a meta word sequence
and delimited by the special symbol 〈/s〉. Each word is rep-
resented using a fixed-width box; if words do not fit into
the box, they are squeezed. Users are provided with buttons
to move forwards or backwards with the word sequence, as
well as a search box (disabled for now) to directly jump to
certain text region. Each vector dimension corresponds to
a line in the select view. Because our vector representation
contains 200 dimensions, there are 200 lines in the figure,
numbered from 0 to 199.
The user starts by selecting a phrase in the word sequence
(e.g., “as needed,” see (A)). This action turns on a set of vec-
tor dimensions (represented as S1), where “turn on” means
the cell value of the dimension, in both of the selected word
positions, is greater than a threshold (default to 0.3, see (C)).
The gray slider (see (B)) further allows the user to select a
few context words (e.g., “other information”) that surround
the current selected phrase. Similarly, this action turns on
a second set of vector dimensions (represented as S2). Note
that our goal is to identify the dimensions that uniquely char-
acterize the selected phrase (“as needed”) but not the sur-
rounding words. As a result, the intersection of the two sets
of dimensions |S1 ∩ S2| are the ones we wish to focus on.
These dimensions are listed in the interface (see (E)).
6lstm.seas.harvard.edu
In the match view, the visual tool continues to search
for text regions where the same set of vector dimensions
(|S1 ∩ S2|) have been turned on. The text regions are fur-
ther ranked by the inverse of number of additional “on” cells
|S1 ∪ S2| and the length of the text region. The top phrases
are listed on the interface (see (F)) with length distribution
plotted (see (G)). The color intensity is used to signal the
value of |S1 ∩ S2|. For the selected phrase (“as needed”),
we observe that several syntactically and semantically sim-
ilar phrases have been selected, including “as is appropriate
to,” “as described below,” “as reasonably possible,” “as rea-
sonably practicable,” and “as set out in.” Several similar ex-
amples are presented in Table 3. These findings suggest that
even in the relatively restricted domain of website privacy
policies, a large number of text variations exist. They use
different text expressions to represent the same or similar
meanings. It is thus left to be seen if creating a comprehen-
sive list of vague terms is feasible given the richness and
complexity of natural language.
Conclusion
In this work we attempt to computationally model the vague-
ness of privacy policies using deep neural networks. The
neural networks learn to generate vector representations for
words in the privacy policies. We explore visualization of the
learnt vector representations, identify dimensions that could
capture language specific characteristics, and present exam-
ple phrases that potentially signal vagueness. Our learned
model and visualization allow researchers to explore the
vagueness of natural language and perform knowledge dis-
covery. We expect future work will include empirical eval-
uations on vagueness datasets and use the vagueness pre-
diction results to assist legal counsels to clarify the privacy
text, as well as raise public awareness of the vague terms as
presented in the website privacy policies.
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